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Summary 
Safety and Risk are in the focus of the constant research ranging from strictly technical and 
technological to organisational influence. The increase of system’s complexity and the shift of 
errors from purely mechanical to human and organisational has hampered the study and the 
prediction of accident probability. This paper reviews the literature for the Safety Management 
System (SMS) in aviation for their ability to account for the complex dynamics from which safety 
in these kinds of systems tends to emerge – or not. After this, it evaluates existing risk assessment 
modelling so as to assess the ‘status’ – or analytical strength –in this domain. The shortcomings of 
those models are presented to identify potential effective model’s elements in relation to assessed 
the body of literature and current complex socio-technological systems present in air 
transportation system and other High Risk Organisation. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
High Reliability (Risk) Organisations (HRO) are 
usually complex technical systems1 consisting of 
large numbers of components that operate in a 
coordinated manner with a potential of catastrophic 
effect to their operators as well as their 
environment in case of the failure. Despite only a 
few “sharp end” operators, the amount of energy 
involved and released in case of their mistake of 
oversight makes them comparable regardless of the 
fact whether they sail, fly or sit in their control 
rooms firmly on the ground. 
The fact that HRO are highly regulated, and 
almost always failure free renders them even more 
difficult to analyse, let alone to study their potential 
failure promoting conditions or consequences. The 
increased complexity of the system together with 
the shift of the problems from technical towards 
organisational and human factors indicated the need 
for the modified approach in managing safety 
within HRO. SMS was one of the answers to this 
situation. 
The structure of the SMS with approach to 
managing safety ranging from initially reactive to 
proactive and finally predictive is just one of the 
answers to this challenge. Human error is not 
                                                          
1
 Aviation, Nuclear Energy, Military, Transport 
Systems, Healthcare 
isolated from the system itself hence the proactive 
approach in this system with relevant Risk 
Assessment and Modelling practices are meant to 
cater for incidents even before they develop in fully 
developed accidents as stated by Lewis [1]. The 
complexity of the system and the interaction 
between its elements does not allow for 
comprehending all possible modes of failure. 
Therefore by effective observation and capturing 
error generating circumstances in the system one 
caters not for incidents and accidents that happened 
already but to attempt to indicate future ones. 
It has been more than 120 years since the start of 
analysis of accident causation in order to prevent 
them or minimise their effect2. The discovery of 
accident causes and circumstances enables their 
investigation, future accident prevention as well as 
the assessment of whether current systems are 
aligned with acceptable level of safety. The 
literature review presented in this paper serves the 
purpose of identifying Risk Modelling and safety 
data management approach appropriate for HRO 
organisations’ nature. 
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 Early research in accident causation and their 
investigation is attributed to Bortkiewicz in 1898. 
1.1 The Evolution of Safety Thinking in 
Aviation 
Incident and accident prevention in aviation was 
reactive before the introduction of SMS. Despite 
the fact that aviation safety level is better, 
compared to other modes of transportation, this 
approach was not good enough due to the nature of 
the industry. The apparent lack of incidents that had 
to be investigated as per national or international 
regulations [2] creates a difficult task when 
exploring trends or investigating circumstances that 
resulted in incident or accident. Having complex 
systems developed even more in the past 70 years 
made the task of accident prevention equally as 
challenging. 
Initially early aviation development since the 
start of commercial flying has been hampered by 
technical flaws and problems. Figure 1. 
demonstrates that, since the introduction of jet 
engines by mid 20th century, the number of 
accidents has been reduced. Average time between 
them has increased to one in 100,000 flight hours 
[3]. 
 
Fig. 1. The Evolution of Safety Thinking [4] 
Having more reliable engines and components 
shifted the focus to other accident root causes. 
Improvements in Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) and Flight Crew training in addition to 
developments mentioned above have improved the 
ratio between accidents and the hours flown even 
more during 1960s and 1970s. Further discrepancy 
between highly developed and organised aviation 
regions continued for next two decades. Eventually 
there was a time when North American airlines 
would have expected an accident every two million 
flight hours while less sophisticated regions would 
have even 42 times less robust system [4]. That was 
the reason why aviation has started to apply 
systematic and regulated efforts to manage safety in 
all aspect of participating organisations. 
2. A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
MODELS 
 
2.1. Historical Review of Generic Accident 
Causation Models 
 
Risk has been under scrutiny as early as the 17th 
century. Roelen makes the point that it was mainly 
the financial risk that has been studied and analysed 
[6]. Initial approach to accidents as sporadic events 
with “Act of God” nature has been modified so 
contemporary research about accident causation in 
industrialised society has been developed by end of 
19th and early in 20th century. 
Griffin states that the initial approach to explain 
accidents solely by the characteristics of their 
participants has changed by the introduction of the 
“Domino Theory” in early 1930s [7]. In his 
presentation of the same Heinrich has connected 
different elements in the chain of events that lead to 
an injury or accident. Among these were societal 
circumstances, human error, operator’s background 
as well as the accident trigger event. 
The focus of all early models on accident 
circumstances originated from military and 
industrial organisations where they were developed 
and applied initially to reduce the number of 
injuries and financial losses generated by mishaps 
and unsafe acts. Towards the mid 20th century 
initial causation theories were enriched by new 
elements and some models for conflict predicting 
have been added to mainly reactive methods in use. 
Netjasov and Janić stated that one of the first 
models that International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) attempted to tackle safety and 
capacity over the North Atlantic was “Machol-
Reich” in late 1960s [8]. Still the number of 
accident investigation models superseded the 
number of accident prediction (by risk assessment 
and management) until 1970s. 
Improvements in systems safety due to the shift 
in understanding the influences on systems 
operations and safety from technological to human 
and organisational factors have gradually 
diminished. Hence, as Netjasov and Janić stated, 
new elements had to be introduced to develop more 
advanced models. For example, management and 
management related influences were introduced by 
Weaver [9] initially followed by Bird and Loftus 
[10]. The initial three elements from the “Domino 
Theory” have been linked when Adams [11] 
introduced organisational error as an element. 
Finally the 90s “Generic Error Modelling System” 
developed by James Reason [5] has been enabled 
through Johnson [12] and his barriers to error 
discussion. 
James Reason’s widely accepted accident 
causation “Swiss Cheese” model is represented by 
rotating cheese slices (Figure 2.). When the threat 
(represented by the arrow) makes it all the way 
from its origin through aligned “cheese” holes, it 
materialises and accident happens. Provided any of 
the slices blocks the path, the threat cannot develop 
further to a mishap.  
 
Fig. 2. Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Model [5] 
 
Despite the fact that this theory has helped to 
develop others3 it has not evolved so much from the 
initial “Domino Theory”. So the end of the 20th and 
early 21st centuries has brought new challenges in 
understanding accident causation in aviation. 
Contemporary systems have commanded the need 
to adjust our “common” modelling to their 
advanced and new logics. 
Papers and books from the late 90s indicate 
several attempts to design over encompassing and 
comprehensive SMS models. Rasmussen’s [13] 
early overview of safety in complex socio 
technological systems established the basis of 
related research areas focused on factors 
contributing to an accident within those systems. 
“Normal Accident” theory introduced by Perrow 
[16] explains system accident by complexity and 
interrelation between systems. This is reinforced by 
Reason’s [5] study of organisational factors and the 
structure that contributes to accidents. Following 
this approach the HRO name has been introduced 
to describe management of complex systems as in 
Rijpma [17]. Focused attention to organisational 
factors and conditions contributing to system safety 
resulted in Hollnagel et al. introducing the notion of 
resilience [18]. 
This has allowed for formal analysis of systems’ 
organisational structure, conditions and their 
response to developing safety issues. Alongside 
these developments aviation has addressed issues 
and adopted recommendations through SMS. [4, 
19] 
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 e.g. TRIPOD DELTA [14] or HFACS [15] 
2.2. Complex Systems’ Safety Modelling 
Characteristics 
 
In her work Leveson confirmed that models 
originating from the end of the 20th century did not 
reflect the complexity of accidents well enough 
[20]. This is very much so when they deal with 
systemic factors such as: limits in the organisational 
structure, inefficient management or limited safety 
culture of the company or the industry in general. 
Enhancing common sequential models is not 
enough and calls for the improvements have been 
made. In order to do that it would be of an utmost 
importance to understand how the system, with all 
relevant organisational and societal components, 
induces accidents (e.g. Figure 3.). 
In addition to this Leveson makes a point about 
how, in systems managed by human as well as 
computer software, errors do not occur separately. 
They are even more affected by the management or 
flaws in safety culture that have not been taken into 
account in classical (i.e. existing) models. In cases 
where models have taken them into account, the 
effect was generally from experience or even 
random. Roelen [6] agrees and adds to that how the 
value of probability of the occurrence that works 
for technical components cannot be the same if a 
human component has been present in the event. 
Finally, reflecting on “The Event Analysis of 
Systemic Teamwork (EAST)” model 
characteristics, Griffin [7] concludes that new 
models should address the system in its entirety not 
as the sum of isolated events or participants [22]. 
The authors are in agreement that accident 
modelling should encourage a holistic view on 
accident causation even before the mishap. There 
are more than 22 threat assessing models and 
software packages as per FAA [23]. Focusing on 
operators, physical components failures or weak 
elements in technological procedures can 
potentially cause missing some of the vital factors 
in future accident prevention. 
 
2.3. Some of the Desired Features of the 
Future Models as per Literature 
Review 
 
Following the discussion about the nature and 
considerations, to be taken into account when 
analysing and modelling accidents the author will 
present critical desired features of the 
contemporary, and advanced, risk models. 
According to Griffin future models should 
enable the study of the systems’ behaviour as a 
whole in both normal and out of normal state to be 
able to study their performance indicators. They 
should be based not only on linear dependency of 
the elements, but take into account other types of 
dependencies such as feedback between model 
elements. Different model levels connected either 
directly or indirectly should be able to influence 
and exchange feedback between each other. 
Problem analysis through systemic approach 
advocated by Rasmussen made Leveson conclude 
that understanding the intention, purpose and the 
decision for system design is crucial for successful 
accident prevention. Focusing on operator’s 
actions, system failures or technological flaws 
could lead to serious omissions in capturing some 
of most influential future accidents’ prevention 
factors. Risk modelling should address more than 
the accident mechanism only for more 
comprehensive investigation practice. 
Fig. 3. Simplified Model of the Dynamics Behind the Shuttle Columbia Loss [21, p.100] 
 
Generally applicable and widely applied two 
dimensional matrix risk assessment (Figure 4.) 
reduces the flexibility of the model and future 
improvements. Griffin agrees with Roelen related 
to more objective risk assessment when stating that 
SMS models for Safety Risk Assessment should 
influence the most important safety risks in the 
system. The probability of failures at “sharp end” 
and organisation structure at higher levels are 
interconnected. A stabile state, input and output 
variables together with their functional relationship 
are crucial for assessing the level of management’s 
influence on risk. Finally, impartial risk assessment 
following modifications to system (either due to 
new technology or regulations) caters for more 
general application of new models. 
 
Fig. 4. ICAO Two Dimensional Risk Matrix [4] 
Netjasov and Janić state that the complexity of 
models that can cater for characteristics mentioned 
above require a modular approach that would 
simplify the process. Simplification is the reason 
for having models that can be used by general 
users. Replication of the calculation and results 
validation are next in line of the desired 
characteristics of the models. The representation of 
complex systems by models inadvertently results in 
their complexity and lengthy calculation process. 
Identified by Roelen that positions the usability of 
the model over the complexity of the same. 
According to Griffin the very exact and 
unforgiving nature of aviation as an industry drives 
requirements for replication of results and 
knowledge transfer from model designers to their 
users. They vary from “sharp end” operators across 
management and regulators to academia. As Stoop 
[24] states, different users require different 
information to be able to identify systemic 
challenges. Operators need information for safe 
operations. Management and regulators need 
indications and means for safety system design. 
Finally academia seek to understand system’s 
nature and the effect of suggested modifications or 
the need for different ones. Finally as Netjasov and 
Janić state, the effective and transparent use of 
module results would be possible only if their 
output is presented by units that can be validated 
objectively [8]. 
3. CONCLUSION 
A number of different literatures have been 
assessed here for their relations to previous and 
current practices to risk modelling and proactive 
safety management. This has been followed by the 
account of risk assessment model characteristics 
identified to be desired for contemporary and future 
models in relevant literature. 
What this review suggests is that a modified 
approach to managing safety in aviation has been 
combined with enabling technological and 
organisational changes and formalised in an 
approach to cater for the nature of recent complex 
systems.  
The formal requirement for data collection and 
analysis due to the nature of the operations and the 
interest of society has resulted in improving the 
level of safety in the aviation system. What this 
review further suggests is that the body of literature 
available for aviation could be applied to other 
HRO having in mind the advancement of formal 
research and regulatory initiatives in aviation 
domain itself. 
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